Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge Classics, 2004, s.520:
“That those experiences which we call ‘perceptions’ are interpretations – interpretations, I suggest, of the total situation in which we find ourselves when ‘perceiving’ – is an insight due to Kant. It has often been formulated, somewhat awkward, by saying that perceptions are interpretations of what is given to us by our senses; and from this formulation sprang the belief that there must be present some ultimate ‘data’, some ultimate material which must be uninterpreted (since interpretation must be of something, and since there cannot be an infinite regress). But this argument does not take into account that (as already suggested by Kant) the process of interpretation is at least partly physiological, so that there are never any uninterpreted data experiences by us: the existence of these uninterpreted ‘data’ is therefore a theory, not a fact of experience, and least of all an ultimate, or ‘basic’ fact.”
Väldigt slagkraftigt, även om slutklämmens terminologi känns lite slipprig. (Not: jfr. Deweys kritik av Russell)
Björn Östbring 