Gellner om våldsmakt, koordinering och legitimitet

The effectiveness of coercion depends on the cohesion of the agents of coercion. Any single one of them is generally weak: to be really effective, it is necessary that there be a number of them, often quite a large number, and that they stick together and maintain discipline. But what exactly makes men stick together, especially in perilous situations, in which betrayal and abandonment of a group — if that group is about to lose — may be by far the best strategy? Among the considerations liable to induce an individual to remain loyal, one of the most important is … Fortsätt läsa Gellner om våldsmakt, koordinering och legitimitet

Randall Calvert om ledarskap och makt

Suppose we identify the ”power” of an individual as that individual’s ability to induce others to take actions that they would not have taken, had the first individual not acted. The leader’s power, then, is founded upon his ability to solve derived coordination problems. Here the leader causes followers to act in concert, whereas they would not otherwise have been able to do so. When the coordination problem is impure, one might say that followers are coerced: due to the leader’s actions, at least some are forced to give up on seeking their favorite outcomes because the leader causes other … Fortsätt läsa Randall Calvert om ledarskap och makt

Brian Barrys kritik av Hardins koordineringsteori

The fundamental objection to Hardin’s whole approach is that to make a state the solution of a coordination problem is far too good an explanation of social order. Coordination conventions have built-in self-enforcing mechanisms that give everybody a strong incentive to comply without any need for any additional enforcement. By contrast, a state has to rely heavily on its ability to call down heavy sanctions on those who break its laws or fail to pay its taxes. Even then, states achieve nothing remotely like the high levels of compliance effortlessly created by coordination conventions. […] It is quite common in … Fortsätt läsa Brian Barrys kritik av Hardins koordineringsteori

David Lewis om vad som kännetecknar en social konvention

Filosofen David Lewis ger ett exempel på vad han menar med en konvention och hur de kan ha sitt ursprung i en överenskommelse: If four men who camp together find that often they waste effort by covering the same ground in search of firewood, they may get fed up and agree once and for all: let Morgan look to the north, Jones to the east, Owen to the south, Griffith to the west. From that day on, each goes his proper way without further discussion. A regularity has begun by explicit agreement. At first, perhaps, it persists because each man feels … Fortsätt läsa David Lewis om vad som kännetecknar en social konvention


När man ser en naturdokumentär tänker man ofta ”oj, häftigt att de lyckats fånga det där på film!”. En japansk räv som jonglerar med ekollon. Coolt! Med samhällsfenomen är det faktiskt ibland på samma sätt. Häromdagen, i en mejlkonversation med en amerikansk forskare, fick jag vibbar av naturdokumentär då jag fann det relevant att tipsa forskaren om att ”there exists actual footage of a diagonal leap in a large-scale pure coordination game”. Jag syftade då på en sekvens fyra minuter in i det här filmklippet som är från Stockholm morgonen den tredje september 1967. Sveriges omläggning till högertrafik är faktiskt … Fortsätt läsa Högertrafikomläggningen