Isaiah Berlin om den logiska positivismen

Isaiah Berlin, Flourishing. Letters 1928—1946, Chatto & Windus, London, 2004, s. 160. Brev till Mary Fisher, 23 mars 1936. My days have chiefly been spent in working honestly at Marx, and elaborating propositions against Logical Positivism (such as that all inductive propositions, acc. to Carnap, must be either tautologies or self-contradictions, which pleases me frightfully). Från Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: By the time he began teaching philosophy he had joined a new generation of rebellious empiricists, some of whom (most notably A. J. Ayer) embraced the logical positivist doctrines of the Vienna Circle and Wittgenstein’s earlier writings. Although Berlin was … Fortsätt läsa Isaiah Berlin om den logiska positivismen

Popper om ”uninterpreted data”

Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge Classics, 2004, s.520: “That those experiences which we call ‘perceptions’ are interpretations – interpretations, I suggest, of the total situation in which we find ourselves when ‘perceiving’ – is an insight due to Kant. It has often been formulated, somewhat awkward, by saying that perceptions are interpretations of what is given to us by our senses; and from this formulation sprang the belief that there must be present some ultimate ‘data’, some ultimate material which must be uninterpreted (since interpretation must be of something, and since there cannot be an infinite regress). But this … Fortsätt läsa Popper om ”uninterpreted data”